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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Richard Miller 
 
In the wake of the Bush-Putin summit in Slovenia, senior Russian foreign policy 
officials continue primarily to hammer away at the proposed American National 
Missile Defense (NMD) system and proposed NATO expansion. And the 
Russians persist with the carrot-and-stick approach; on one hand, they speak of 
consultation and cooperation; on the other, they threaten arms races and treaty 
withdrawal. 
 
NMD and ABM 
On the cooperative note, former defense minister and now special presidential 
advisor Igor Sergeev hinted at initiating a prolonged dialogue. Meeting with 
various Bush administration officials in Washington between 16-20 June, he 
called for clarification of US statements on warhead reductions in return for ABM 
treaty modification. As a former strategic rocket forces commander, he assumed 
the role of a strategic weapons "specialist" simply requiring greater information to 
move forward in the discussions. (INTERFAX, 0745 GMT, 23 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0623, via World News Connection) Sergeev has called for international 
analysis of proliferation threats, free from political considerations, to determine 
the best way to proceed. He and Russian defense ministry officials also have 
hinted at possible warhead reductions on the Russian side to 1,000-1,500 
warheads. (INTERFAX, 1132 GMT, 29 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0629, via World 
News Connection) These figures essentially are driven by financial 
considerations due to Russia's inability to maintain the currently larger force; they 
also match the numbers purportedly being considered by the Bush 
administration. Such numbers of warheads are anticipated in current START-III 
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drafts. Whether or not this approach becomes a central aspect of possible 
START-III negotiations remains to be seen. 
 
But Moscow and Putin are doing their best to play their hand from a clearly 
weaker position at the bargaining table. While references to further discussions 
lingered after the summit, tough rhetoric also followed, with Putin threatening to 
pull out of all strategic arms treaties if the US amended or withdrew from the 
ABM treaty. Additionally, the Russians claimed that they would be forced to 
consider MIRVing their missiles to counter any potential US shield. Hints of a 
putative MIRV response emanated from many Russian officials, including the 
new commander of the Missile Troops, General Nikolai Solovtsov. At a military 
academy graduation ceremony he said that "if the U.S. continues to step up work 
in this direction [NMD development], Russia and missile troops are capable of 
reciprocating with some measures which will help set off such developments." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0514 GMT, 24 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0624, via World News 
Connection) This was orchestrated by the tests of two MIRVed missiles in June. 
An SS-H-23 submarine-launched ballistic missile was fired (ITAR-TASS, 1444 
GMT, 28 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0628, via World News Connection) as was a 
land-based SS-19. Defense ministry sources evaluated the 27 June SS-19 test: 
"These [SS-19] have very much greater chances of overcoming the missile 
defense system of a potential enemy than the Topol-M modern missile systems." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0701 GMT, 27 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0627, via World News 
Connection) There is only one enemy they could have in mind with that 
statement. 
 
Putin also continues to line up international support for his opposition to US 
NMD. In the reversal of the Cold War triangulation involving China and the US 
versus the USSR, Putin has now aligned with China to counter perceived US 
hegemony. In the same carrot-stick mindset, Russian officials are careful at least 
publicly to put a thin veneer of diplomacy on the initiative so as not to paint an 
entirely anti-US picture. Leading up to Putin's meeting with the Chinese president 
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to sign a new cooperation treaty, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov 
stated, "it's incorrect to explain the rapprochement of Russia and China with anti-
American feelings or the striving for military-political union." However, he also 
added, "naturally, the rapprochement is based on similar assessments of 
international development prospects, but it is mostly explained with the pragmatic 
understanding of national interests of the two countries." (ITAR-TASS, 1843 
GMT, 3 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0703, via World News Connection) The Russian 
president also made the anti-NMD stand a centerpiece in his talks with French 
President Jacques Chirac last week in Moscow. Putin certainly had to have been 
pleased with the joint statement released following the latter summit that included 
the Russian criticisms of US missile defense plans. As the Western European 
power most likely to challenge perceived US predominance, it is not surprising 
that Putin courted France.  
 
NATO expansion 
Moscow also is continuing to express opposition to NATO expansion, albeit with 
less conviction of success as NATO members show increasing determination to 
accept new members. According to a Russian defense ministry statement, 
"NATO remains a military-political organization. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union have ceased to exist. We do not understand the meaning of NATO's 
enlargement and feel uncomfortable and concerned about this. Further 
strengthening of this powerful military alliance may cause instability in the whole 
of Europe." On Baltic state admission, the ministry added, "[the alliance] will 
directly approach the Russian borders and we shall have to take responsive 
military measures to guarantee our national security." (INTERFAX, 0723 GMT, 3 
Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0703, via World News Connection) And if words were 
not enough, on 29 June Russia began a large, 10-day command post exercise in 
the Leningrad military district and Baltic Fleet -- the military forces that border the 
three Baltic states. This coincided with the NATO's Supreme Allied Commander's 
trip to the Baltic states. US General Joseph Ralston's visit was designed to 
assess the progress of the three Baltic states on meeting the conditions for 
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NATO accession. According to statements, he was favorably impressed. (LETA, 
1412 GMT, 28 Jun 01, and ITAR-TASS, 0936 GMT, 28 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0628, via World News Connection) Coincidentally or not, the Russian Baltic 
exercise also began as the NATO Partnership for Peace exercise, Cooperative 
Partner 2001, wrapped up in Georgia. The Russian defense ministry stated that 
the Baltic exercise was "not a warning measure," yet it was the first time an 
operation of this scale was conducted there in over 12 years. (RIA, 0928 GMT, 
29 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0629, via World News Connection) Baltic and 
Georgian officials clearly have stated their interests in NATO membership, 
although recognizing its geographic position, Georgia also has expressed its 
desire not to mar its relationship with Russia. Russia, however, says that it is a 
cooperative partner of NATO and that cooperation cannot develop further if its 
views and desires are not heeded and enlargement plans halted. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma keeps busy 
The Russian members of parliament have been fairly active in the past month. 
Some of the most significant bills considered were: a draft appeal to the 
leadership of the Serb Republic of Yugoslavia not to hand over Slobodan 
Milosevic to The Hague tribunal, passed by a vote of 272 to 77, with one 
abstention (RIA, 0858 GMT, 28 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0628, via World News 
Connection); an ominous constitutional law "On admission of new constituent 
parts to the Russian Federation," approved by 375 votes, with one abstention -- 
just which new territory does Moscow have in mind? (INTERFAX, 1304 GMT, 28 
Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0628, via World News Connection); an approval in the 
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first reading of a federal draft law on privatization of (non-strategic) state and 
municipal property, approved 266 to 132 (ITAR-TASS, 0551 GMT, 22 Jun 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0622, via World News Connection); as well as an anti-tobacco 
law, passed in the third and final reading, which provides guidelines for cigarette 
content, warning labels, a minimum number (20) of cigarettes per package, 
locales for tobacco sales, smoke-free workplace and transportation provisions, 
and finally, a limitation on the portrayal of smoking in films and plays, as well as a 
prohibition on media outlets showing public and political figures smoking. 
(INTERFAX, 0947 GMT, 21 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0621, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The most controversial bill to pass through the State Duma in the past month, 
however, was the government's draft of the Land Code. The Communists and 
their obedient sidekicks, the Agrarians, originally had tried to cancel or delay the 
first reading of the draft; on the day of the reading, their supporters picketed the 
State Duma building and even stopped traffic on nearby Okhotnyi Ryad Street for 
30 minutes. A number of the communist leaders spoke at the improvised rally 
and the picketers accosted non-communist deputies headed into the Duma 
assembly with whistles and jeering. 
 
The agitation did not stop at the doors. Agrarian deputy Nikolai Kharitonov 
brought a loaf of bread with him as a symbolic argument. The Agrarians and 
Communists chanted "shame, shame" and tried to prevent the main speaker, 
German Gref, from getting to the podium by crowding the space at and around it. 
In an attempt to resolve the issue, Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev announced 
a recess and called Vladimir Putin. The Russian president promised to discuss 
all of the changes to the second draft with leaders of all factions, but this did not 
assuage the leftists. Passions got so aroused that a fist fight broke out. Aware of 
the futility of their protests, Communist and Agrarian deputies walked out before 
the vote (which approved the bill 251 to 22 with three abstentions). As for the 
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Duma speaker, he was taken to the hospital to be treated for high blood 
pressure. (ORT, 15 Jun 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
JUDICIARY 
Death penalty debate resurfaces 
An equally major controversy concerns the death penalty. When Russia entered 
the Council of Europe in February of 1996, it placed a moratorium on the use of 
the death sentence and pledged to sign Protocol No. 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which outlaws the death penalty, within a year, 
and to ratify it within three years. Russia still has not come through on this 
promise. Furthermore, recently a number of political figures (including former 
dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn) have spoken in favor of abolishing the 
moratorium after jury trials are instituted throughout the nation. In response, the 
president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Lord Russell-
Johnston, noted that a cancellation of the moratorium "would inevitably lead to 
the questioning of whether Russia is fit to continue as a member of the Council of 
Europe." (DECLARATION BY THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY 
PRESIDENT, 31 May 01; via www.stars.coe.fr)  
 
Those in favor of re-instituting the death sentence call attention to Russia's 
uniqueness and to polls which indicate that most Russians support the death 
penalty. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov declared that "what is good to 
quieten Europe does not fit Russia.... Europe does not have Chechnya, Europe 
does not have (rebel leader Shamil) Basaev... special conditions authorize 
special measures." (ITAR-TASS, 0844 GMT, 13 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0613, 
via World News Connection) Perhaps the strongest argument against the death 
penalty concerns not the concept itself, but its potential application to those 
seized for "drug trafficking" (a request made by a number of regional leaders, 
including Irkutsk Region Governor Boris Govorin, Chelyabinsk Mayor Vyacheslav 
Tarasov, Chelyabinsk Region Governor Petr Sumin, and Sverdlovsk Region 
Governor Eduard Rossel). Prominent writer and chairman of the Russian 
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presidential clemency commission, Anatoly Pristavkin, summed up this 
argument: "In our country, if there is a need to arrest a person, a package with 
drugs is put into his pocket right before his eyes and then retrieved in the 
presence of witnesses. So now we are going to execute such 'drug-dealers.'" 
(ITAR-TASS, 1608 GMT, 26 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0626, and INTERFAX, 
1556 GMT, 13 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0613, via World News Connection)  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Out with the old... 
Earlier insinuations that the number of committees in the Duma would be 
reduced from 28 to 12 and that committee portfolios would be redistributed are 
still hanging over the heads of the Communists; now there are also rumors that 
government-favorite Unity is on a crusade to replace Nikolai Troshkin, the head 
of the Duma Office of Administration (an entity that is accused of serving solely 
the interest of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation). There is also 
speculation about the replacement of the (Communist) State Duma Speaker 
Gennady Seleznev on the grounds that his party no longer constitutes the largest 
faction in the Duma. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0622, via World News Connection) 
 
...and in with the new 
Meanwhile, prominent businessman Boris Berezovsky has reasserted his 
intention to "set up a political party in Russia, a real opposition party that will 
struggle for power... find a common language with the patriotic part of society 
and express its interests... [and] combine the ideas of liberalism with the ideas of 
patriotism." Berezovsky had originally intended to throw his weight and money 
behind the Union of Right Forces (SPS) but had been rebuffed by SPS's new 
leader, Boris Nemtsov. His sponsorship of channel TV-6 most likely is not 
completely unconnected with his quest. (INTERFAX, 0907 GMT, 1 Jul 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0620, via World News Connection, and THE MOSCOW TIMES, 30 
May 01; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
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Also, the Russian political movement Enterprise Development officially has 
declared itself a political party. Leader Ivan Grachev announced that the party 
"has over 11,000 members with fully-fledged party structures numbering more 
than one hundred persons in over 50 Russian regions," which means that 
Enterprise Development will be eligible for official status once the bill on political 
parties (approved by the lower house in the third and final reading on 21 June by 
a vote of 238 votes to 164 with no abstentions) makes its rounds. (ITAR-TASS, 
1221 GMT, 16 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0616, and INTERFAX, 0751 GMT, 21 
June 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0621, via World News Connection) 
 
REGIONS 
This can't be good news 
At least six of the Ten Plagues have descended upon the Russian Federation. 
(Quick reminder: (1) The Nile waters turn to blood; (2) The frogs; (3) The lice; (4) 
The flies; (5) The disease of livestock; (6) The boils; (7) The hailstorm; (8) The 
locusts; (9) The darkness; (10) The death of the firstborn) 
 
(1) Water has not turned to blood, but the flooding certainly caused loss of life 
(with as many as 15 persons reported dead) -- and a little bit of blood-letting in 
the apparat -- with Anvar Shamuzafarov, former chairman of Gosstroy (State 
Committee for Construction and the Housing and Municipal Complex) as the 
number one victim. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 23 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0625, via World News Connection) More recently, flooding also has reached 
emergency status in the Irkutsk oblast'. (ORT, 9 Jun 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
(5) While the scare of mad cow disease actually has been alleviated, a number of 
restrictions remain in effect -- especially in Kyrgyzstan where reports of possible 
infection were received. (INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 1 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0601, via World News Connection) 
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(7) It's unlikely that a hailstorm brought down the TU-154 on 3 July, but then 
again, historically, the official Russian (and Soviet) explanations for catastrophes 
are usually equally doubtful. The surprising factor is how much the Russian 
president has learned about PR since the Kursk disaster. Not that many more 
people died when the plane mysteriously extended its landing gear, turned 180 
degrees, and crashed not far from the city of Irkutsk: 145 versus 118. This time, 
however, Putin's reaction was lightning-quick. He expressed his condolences to 
the families, and decreed 5 July 2001 to be an official day of mourning, with flags 
flying at half-mast, entertainment shows pulled from television broadcasts, and 
an official moment of silence to start that day at many enterprises. (ORT, 4 Jul 
01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
(8) Over 339,800 hectares of land have been plagued by locusts in Dagestan 
and in the Stavropol Territory. 
 
(9) Darkness descends. In Russia no one is surprised when homes are left 
without water and electricity for days, when television or radio stations suspend 
broadcasts, or when "all auxiliary facilities" of military bases lose their power 
supply for non-payment, as at the Northern Fleet Belomorskaya naval base in 
Severodvinsk a couple of weeks ago. (ITAR-TASS, 2218 GMT, 22 Jun 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0623, via World News Connection) An interesting development, 
however, was Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's statement to journalists on 26 
June regarding the "prospects for introducing presidential rule" in the Maritime 
region if the situation gets "critical" next winter. (RIA, 26 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0626, via World News Connection) It will be interesting to see to what extent the 
"deeper intervention" by federal authorities will go. 
 
(10) As for the tenth plague -- the death of the newly free media while still in their 
infancy: this time, no one has been spared. When, on 23 May, Vladimir Gusinsky 
transferred his 14 percent of Ekho Moskvy shares to the radio station's team of 
journalists, there was some hope that this successful and popular station would 
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escape the Media-MOST carnage. But then, on 2 July, the Russian Federation 
prosecutor-general and the Federal Security Services froze the share transfer. 
Gazprom has promised to keep coverage objective and independent, but there is 
much understandable skepticism concerning this guarantee. Five deputy editors -
- Marina Koroleva, Irina Tsvei, Sergei Buntman, Tatyana Shcheglova and 
Vladimir Varfolomeev -- resigned the following Friday, 6 July. (INTERFAX, 1147 
GMT, 2 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0702, via World News Connection, and THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 9 Jul 01; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
Then, there is TV-6 itself, which took on a number of NTV journalists, including 
prominent Itogi program anchor Yevgeny Kisilev. The television channel's 
chairman, Badri Patarkatsishvili, who is currently out of the country, has been 
ordered to appear in court. He told journalists that "immediately after the NTV 
team headed by Yevgeny Kisilev came over to TV-6, a stream of lawsuits came 
down on the company while company staff was blackmailed and threatened." 
(INTERFAX, 1714 GMT, 29 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0629, via World News 
Connection) 
 
There is no mystery as to what the government is trying to achieve. President 
Putin's message to Media-Soyuz, a new media union, sums it all up. "A free 
press is the most important guarantor of the irreversibility of our country's 
democratic course," he declared, but then noted ominously the need for 
"journalists who work constructively, in the interests of all society... [and] 
contribute to the formation of Russia's single information space." (RIA, 0722 
GMT, 13 Jun 01; FBIS- SOV-2001-0613, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Personnel changes resume 
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When Putin installed Sergei Ivanov as defense minister late in March and shifted 
several other senior MOD positions, he promised no further shake-up of 
personnel for at least two to three months. Well, time is up: On 29 June, Putin 
signed the decree retiring Colonel General Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of 
the General Staff. A defense ministry spokesman said Manilov was discharged 
because he had reached the maximum age for military service, 60 years. 
Actually, Manilov is 62, having continued service the past two years on an 
extension waiver. Closer to the truth, Manilov probably was released due to 
increasing differences with Defense Minister Ivanov. Manilov had become a 
"fixture" in this staff posting. Over the past few years, he actively spearheaded 
work on Russia's military doctrine and other key documents as well as serving as 
a vocal spokesman for operations in Chechnya. Unofficial sources indicated the 
post of first deputy may be eliminated in the military reform efforts. (ITAR-TASS, 
0544 GMT, 30 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0630, via World News Connection) This 
would be consistent with predictions that Ivanov would use his ties to the 
president and strengthened position to squash dissenting opinions for his reform 
efforts within the upper ranks of the MOD.  
 
It was also announced that Colonel General Leonid Ivashov soon will leave his 
post as chief of the defense ministry's Main Department on International Military 
Cooperation, although that post will remain within the structure of the defense 
ministry. Ivashov was offered another post on the military coordinating body of 
the CIS -- the place to which senior Russian officers are banished apparently 
when they fall out of favor with the current leadership. Former commander of the 
Strategic Rocket Forces, General Yakovlev, recently was appointed there as 
chief of staff; Ivashov would become his first deputy. (INTERFAX, 0958 GMT, 3 
Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0703, via World News Connection) Ivashov's current 
post was a source of early friction between Ivanov and Chief of Staff Anatoly 
Kvashnin in April when Kvashnin tried to fire Ivashov and transfer the functions of 
that department out of the General Staff. In recent weeks, rumors that Kvashnin 
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also may soon be sacked have been circulating. (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 26 
Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0626, via World News Connection)  
 
Senior officers are not the only targets of personnel changes. Defense Minister 
Ivanov has stated that he wants to accelerate manpower reductions to help 
finance the military reform efforts. Ivanov said he considers it "justified and 
desirable" to have the bulk of the cuts in the Russian armed forces made in 
2002-2003, faster than originally projected. He is predicting the first real "fruits" of 
military reform and professionalization will not be evident until the 2005 
timeframe. (INTERFAX, 1641 GMT, 24 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0624, via World 
News Connection) With some 100,000 troops cut by the end of 2001, the follow-
on reductions may go a little deeper than initial estimates. A defense ministry 
spokesman said the "optimal size" when completed will be a military force of 1 
million (this does not include the armed services of other "power ministries"). 
(INTERFAX, 1118 GMT, 29 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0629, via World News 
Connection) Accelerating the cuts will make more funding available for 
investments in hardware and welfare programs for the troops.  
 
Aviation highlighted 
As one of the areas in dire need for hardware investment, statements and 
articles concurrent with the recent Paris Airshow have again spotlighted the 
crumbling state of Russian military aviation. Speaking in Yekaterinburg to the 5th 
Air Force and Air Defense Army, the Air Force chief of staff, General Anatoly 
Kornukov, stated the current condition of Russian aircraft is "critical" and that 
"there is no money to buy new equipment." He said the Air Force will buy a paltry 
few new Su-30 fighters and one to two new S-400 air defense missile systems 
next year. In tune with Defense Minister Ivanov, Kornukov is pinning his hopes 
on the 2005 timeframe to start receiving needed equipment. (INTERFAX, 1400 




A recent article by Viktor Litovkin derided not only the problems mentioned above 
by Kornukov, but other inherent problems as well, including: the lack of simulator 
trainers, lack of upgraded avionics and radar in current airframes, and "half-
hearted decisions in the re-structuring of the aviation industry itself." 
(OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 21 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0621, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Inflation may offset budget benefits 
Underpinning the success of any military reform efforts is proper financing. In a 
recent article titled "Leaving Inflation for Later," Dr. Mikhail Delyagin, economics 
professor and director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, defends recent 
increases in the MOD budget but doubts they will be enough to achieve reform. 
While the 13.4% budget increase over last year helps to address readiness 
problems and pay for the troops, he says inflation will cause the real increase in 
defense purchasing power to rise only by .36-1.25%. If inflation turns out to be 
higher than predicted, or inadequate government controls fail to achieve 
projected GDP growth and revenue collection, then next year military spending 
actually may suffer a decrease in real terms. (ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, 26 Jun 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0626, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The other great schism 
Over the last several weeks, there was substantial discussion (to put it mildly) of 
the religious divisions plaguing Ukraine. Analysts and reporters examined the 
issue from just about every conceivable angle. But another division that will likely 
also cause problems in the future was talked about very little. 
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As Ukraine moves closer and closer to Western international organizations, it 
seems to move farther and farther away from Western human rights norms. As 
the country begins to involve itself more closely with NATO and the European 
Union, it continues to be plagued by a clampdown on media; governmental 
strong-arming of the judiciary, kompromat politics, and corruption. 
 
Although the disconnect between foreign and domestic policies has been a factor 
in Ukrainian politics for years, it has intensified dramatically since the Georgiy 
Gongadze scandal. During this period President Leonid Kuchma seems to have 
realized that he and his supporters were beyond the reach both of Ukraine's 
domestic laws and of the international community's temporary indignation. Since 
then, media repression has intensified in the country, pressure on independent 
judges has reached new heights and Kuchma's control over the country's cabinet 
has become almost absolute. At the same time, Ukraine has solidified its 
Western-oriented foreign policy by aligning itself more closely with NATO and the 
European Union. In fact, some have suggested that this cooperation with the 
West may reach new levels with Ukraine's dispatch of a peacekeeping force to 
Macedonia. 
 
On 5-6 July, Ukraine hosted a NATO conference attended by 350 
representatives from 17 member-countries and 19 partner-countries. The 
pronouncements of Ukraine's leaders left little doubt about their policy toward 
NATO. The state news agency Ukrinform noted that Foreign Minister Anatoliy 
Zlenko called cooperation with the European Union and NATO a key aspect of 
the country's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Yevhen Marchuk, Ukraine's National 
Security Council secretary, reiterated his country's desire to become a member 
of the European Union. (UKRINFORM, 5 July 01) Perhaps most significantly, 
Volodymyr Hobulyn, the head of Ukraine's Commission for the Defense-Industrial 
Complex, suggested that Ukraine's policy of neutrality may become impossible to 
maintain if Russia continues its opposition to NATO expansion. Because of 
difficult relations between NATO and Russia, he told the conference, Ukraine 
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could end up on "the border . . . of the sphere of influence between NATO and 
Russia." In this case, he implied, Ukraine may sacrifice its neutrality to side with 
NATO in foreign policy matters. (UKRINFORM, 6 July 01) 
 
For his part, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson went out of his way to 
embrace Ukraine during the conference. Just the fact that the conference was 
held in Kyiv was significant, but Robertson's statements suggesting a future 
expansion of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine were even more 
important. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 5 Jul 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
According to the Ukrainian daily Kievskiye Vedomosti, this future cooperation 
could come in the very near term. On 6 July, reporter Serhiy Kyselyov wrote that 
Robertson and Kuchma have agreed on the inclusion of a Ukrainian battalion in 
the upcoming Macedonian peacekeeping mission, if NATO allies are not able to 
muster the necessary 3,000 soldiers. Kyselyov noted Robertson's particular 
concern about Germany's ability to produce its promised battalion.  
 
Kyselyov's report, of course, has not been confirmed and in many ways seems 
questionable. There is little doubt that Ukraine would be interested in assisting 
NATO, especially given the recent statements of its leaders, but would NATO 
want to risk angering Russia? Perhaps yes, if the organization truly believes 
Ukraine is as important to European security as many of its representatives have 
stated in recent days. And there is no doubt that Macedonian officials trust 
Ukraine -- they have visited during the crisis, sent their pilots to be trained at 
Ukrainian airfields and taken possession with gratitude of a small but significant 
amount of military hardware. Having a trusted Slavic participant in the 
peacekeeping operation would clearly be an asset for NATO. Still, involving a 
non-member in a NATO operation would be a tricky proposition. However, 
regardless of what does or does not happen with Ukrainian peacekeeping in 
Macedonia, the NATO conference has moved forward the Ukrainian-NATO 
relationship. This, combined with new interest in Ukraine on the part of European 
Union leaders, confirms Ukraine's success in forging positive relationships with 
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Western international organizations and enhances the country's international 
profile. 
 
Ukraine's leadership has not been so successful in forging positive relationships 
with its domestic organizations -- particularly those related to the media. While 
these leaders were basking in the glow of the NATO conference, television 
reporter and director Ihor Alexandrov lay in a coma as the result of a beating 
taken in the stairwell of the station where he worked. He died without regaining 
consciousness the day after the conference ended. As a result of this attack, 
which came on the heels of the Gongadze murder, the human rights watchdog 
group Reporters Without Borders called Ukrainian violence against journalists the 
worst in Europe. 
 
Alexandrov was no stranger to repression. He was jailed in 1998 after reporting 
on the corruption of local officials in the Donbas; his release came only after his 
case was heard in the European Court of Human Rights. Despite this 
experience, Alexandrov apparently continued to investigate and report on 
corruption. Therefore, while it is possible that he was the victim of a crime 
unrelated to his work, it seems that Alexandrov finally received a sentence that 
could not be overturned by any international tribunal. Kuchma and Prime Minister 
Anatoliy Kinakh have not commented on the Alexandrov case -- they were too 
busy hosting the conference. 
 
Hrach ratchets up the pressure again 
President Kuchma responded to the ongoing (and never-ending) political crisis in 
the Crimean Republic last week by trying his best to do nothing. 
 
At the end of June, the communist speaker of the Crimean Parliament, Leonid 
Hrach, once again issued his semi-annual demand that Kuchma dismiss the 
reformist Crimean Prime Minister, Serhiy Kunitsyn. Hrach has been calling for 
Kunitsyn's ouster for several years, but had no legal ammunition until May of last 
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year. At that time, Hrach's Communist-dominated parliament passed a vote of no 
confidence in Kunitsyn and his cabinet. The victory was hollow, however. 
President Kuchma must approve any action to dismiss a Crimean cabinet, and 
he has declined steadfastly to do so. Kunitsyn is a loyal Kuchma ally, and the 
president values his position in the rebellious Crimea. 
 
Nevertheless, Hrach is loud and persistent and Kuchma clearly felt some type of 
action was needed. He acted, therefore, as any good politician would when he 
doesn't want to do anything -- he set up a commission. This "special group" will 
"study the situation and talk to people," Kuchma's chief of staff said. But, there 
should be no illusions about the situation, Volodymyr Litvyn noted. "The fact that 
there is still no solution shows that we are interested in preserving stability and 
the fragile balance that presently exists," he said. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 3 Jul 01; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) That balance leaves Hrach, a dedicated 
communist with close ties to Gennady Zyuganov and dreams of joining the 
Russia-Belarus Union, on one side, and Kunitsyn, a reformer with close ties to 
Kyiv and dreams of realigning the autonomous republic with the Ukrainian center, 
on the other. Although the power struggle often results in political stalemates, 
Kyiv has shown no inclination to alter the situation. A formerly secessionist 
republic embroiled in political stagnation is clearly more desirable than one with a 
strong, but hostile, political system. 
 
Consequently, while Kuchma plays lip service to Hrach's demands for attention, 




Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Welcome to Oz... 
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On 28 June the Duma adopted on the third reading the ominous law "On the 
procedure for accepting into the Russian Federation and constituting within it a 
new subject of the RF." The law establishes a procedure for adding new 
territories and reorganizing territories already in the Russian Federation. New 
territories may include whole states or portions of foreign states. The measure 
passed with 375 votes, none opposed and one abstention. In the absence of the 
text of the law, summaries appearing in polit.ru and Interfax on 28 June are being 
employed here. 
 
The law specifies a procedure for adding new members which is a simplification 
of the process of constitutional amendment. Regions can be merged into larger 
units, if the regional legislatures initiate this process and the populations approve 
in referenda. The project subsequently must be approved by both houses of the 
Federal Assembly. Then the new entity can be added to the constitution. The 
addition of a foreign state would require an international treaty, a review by the 
constitutional court, and ratification in the Duma. It's unclear how a foreign 
territory that is not a state could be incorporated into the Russian Federation.  
 
This law has several consequences. It clarifies the conditions under which the 
incorporation of Belarus could proceed. That state would not be able to enter as 
an equal partner, as it has insisted, but would have to become a region within the 
Russian Federation. The law is consistent with the Kremlin's regional policy in 
that it creates possibilities for revising Russia's federal system by merging 
regions into larger units. However, it seems that regional governments retain 
some protection against such measures. 
 
Creating a process for the incorporation of foreign territory into the RF is an 
aggressive political proclamation with no legal consequences. Having nurtured 
rebellious autonomies in neighboring states, Russia tries to use them as leverage 
in its relations with those states and raises the possibility of incorporating the 
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territories into Russia. No rosy glasses or posturing in the Duma can legitimate 
what is a patently illegal process of imperial expansion.  
 
A spokesman of the Azerbaijani opposition Musavat Party, Sulhaddin Akbar, 
denounced the legislation, saying: "This decision shows that Russia has not still 
stopped its empire policy. The purpose is to strengthen separatist movements in 
the newly formed independent states, break stability in those states, and so, to 
broaden influence possibilities of Russia in the region." (DEMCONGRESS 
BULLETIN N19, 3 Jul 01) 
 
Indeed, the separatists reacted rapidly. A two-day meeting of the "foreign 
ministers" from the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transdniestr was held in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, from 2 to 
4 July. The participants sought to coordinate strategies to press their case 
against the central authorities of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 3 Jul 01 and MONITOR 10 Jul 01)  
 
This was far from the first occasion of coordination among the rebel entities. On 
20 -22 November 2000, the "foreign ministers" of the same four separatist 
territories met in Tiraspol to coordinate their policies and issue a joint statement 
that was publicized from Yerevan. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 1 Dec 00) 
This immediately preceded the 27-28 November 2000 OSCE conference where 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and other members of GUUAM were expected to 
press Russia to comply with its various international obligations (and to cease its 
support for the separatists).  
 
Moreover, according to a former OSCE official, such meetings have been held on 
several other occasions in the past, including a gathering in Moscow in the fall of 
1999 with representatives of the same separatist entities participating. The 
Moscow meeting may have included consultations with representatives from the 
Russian military and the Duma. The regress from Yel'tsin to Putin is notable: 
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Under Yel'tsin such meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring states was 
conducted semi-clandestinely and US diplomats heard tidbits about these 
meetings in passing. Under Putin, this particular Russian pressure on its GUUAM 




A wicked witch is dead ... 
One wicked witch, Arbi Baraev -- the Chechen commander linked to a number of 
hostage-taking incidents and to the FSB -- is dead. Another wicked witch, 
General Valery Manilov -- the first deputy chief of the General Staff and military 
spokesman on Chechnya -- was relieved of his duties and retired on 29 June. 
According to Anna Politkovskaya, the FSB has started killing off its own network 
of informants in Chechnya. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 28 Jun 01) These developments 
could be interpreted as clearing the way for talks with Aslan Maskhadov. 
 
Some have even started thinking about the contents of a solution. The deputy 
prime minister in Maskhadov's government, Apti Bisyltanov, would compromise 
on the status of Chechnya. Chechnya would be sovereign but it would also 
recognize special Russian economic and political prerogatives. In this context, it 
is useful to remember that Dzhokhar Dudaev, Chechnya's first president, offered 
a deal by which Chechnya would remain in the ruble zone and forbear from 
joining anti-Russian alliances. The Radio Liberty correspondent, Andrei Babitsky, 
has suggested that, if accompanied by a condemnation of Basaev's incursion 
into Dagestan and Maskhadov's inaction in this regard, and if it were legitimized 
by a referendum on Chechnya's status, the package solution should bring 
hostilities to an end. (RADIO LIBERTY, 29 Jun 01)  
 
...but munchkins have little to celebrate 
In fact, "cleansings" against Chechen civilians have intensified over the last 
week. Mass arrests of Chechen males were conducted in Starye Atagi, and the 
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village Alkhan Yurt was subjected to the second "cleansing" over a two-week 
period. On 5 July two more local district administrators from Sernovodsk and 
Assinovskaya resigned in protest over the cleansings in their districts. In 
response to the charges of illegality and repression, FSB Director Nikolai 
Patrushev explained that Chechen "fighters commit crimes in Chechnya, using 
Russian uniforms for this purpose." (POLIT.RU, 4, 5, and 6 Jul 01)  
 
The journalist Politkovskaya published a list of persons who were arrested from 
villages in the Vedeno district that she had visited in February. Following her 
investigative reporting on the torture and trade of Chechen prisoners by Russian 
military personnel, there were inquiries and investigations. In March all was calm, 
it seemed the "cleansings" had ceased. Then came "April, May, June ... And 
now, tragedy. Those who, without giving a damn about the consequences, 
decided to talk publicly with me are no longer with us. Disappeared. Shot. Bodies 
sold back... How am I supposed to live now? What is happening in this country? 
For talking to a journalist the governing authorities can kill?" (NOVAYA GAZETA, 
2 Jul 01) 
 
Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain 
As the Chechen war limps through its second summer, the Russian forces are 
unable to break the Chechen resistance and President Vladimir Putin is unwilling 
to begin peace talks. Neither Putin nor his aides have articulated coherent 
objectives and strategies. Instead, they seem to have chosen to ignore the 
magnitude of the problem in favor of doing what they have been doing -- 
brutalizing the population, driving the Russian military to the point of collapse, 
and occasionally shaking up the cadres.  
 
As a result of this neglect, articulating federal policy for Chechnya has fallen on 
the unlikely shoulders of one Beslan Gantamirov, recently appointed to the post 
of federal inspector for the South Federal District. Gantamirov describes his 
duties as preparing and conducting elections in Chechnya, drafting a constitution, 
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training personnel, and coordinating the activities of other agencies and 
organizations. Gantamirov has been studying the Tatarstan model and holding 
consultations with Ruslan Khasbulatov, Salambek Khadzhiev, Umar 
Avturkhanov, and Aslambek Aslakhanov, among other prominent "Moscow 
Chechens." In the next few weeks he will propose a new constitution of a 
parliamentary republic (without the office of president) which would be in line with 
the Russian constitution. Election to this body would be held next spring. 
(OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST, 29 Jun 01; via 
lexis-nexis)  
 
Beslan Gantamirov has had a very colorful career. At one time an associate of 
Dzhokhar Dudaev, Gantamirov joined the federal side during the first war and 
was appointed mayor of Grozny. From that position he was sent to jail on 
embezzlement charges and was set free only in 1999 to form a Chechen militia 
which would assist the federal forces in their operations against Grozny. Last 
summer he was briefly appointed deputy to Koshman, then Kadyrov (his bitter 
rival), and then named mayor of Grozny. As mayor he came into public 
confrontation with the MVD, was reprimanded by MVD Minister Boris Gryzlov 
and subsequently tendered his resignation. Just two weeks later General Viktor 
Kazantsev, the presidential representative to the southern district, appointed him 
federal inspector, potentially a more powerful position than mayor.  
 
Gantamirov's conflict with the MVD became public in the aftermath of the MVD's 
May Day "cleansing" of the Grozny market. This event involved clashes between 
Gantamirov's militia and the MVD during which marauding troops shot up the 
market and nearby buildings, killing three Chechen guards as well as arresting 
and severely beating over a dozen others. According to the polit.ru news service, 
the Russian military commandant was barred from entering the city. On 3 May, 
Gantamirov -- who was not present in Grozny during those events -- denounced 
the MVD for beating and killing Chechen civilians. On 4 May the power ministers, 
Nikolai Patrushev (FSB), Sergei Ivanov (MOD), and Boris Gryzlov (MVD), met in 
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Grozny and thoroughly chewed out their subordinates. The resignations and 
dismissals which seemingly are still in flux followed on this tumultuous meeting.  
 
Then came the news that five ethnic Russians were murdered in Grozny. 
Gantamirov ordered his militia to find those responsible and execute them on the 
spot. "It is not a matter of shooting everyone. We are only referring to criminals. If 
you see that a terrorist is planting a bomb or preparing a terrorist act, just kill him 
and there will be no detentions or arrests," Gantamirov told Interfax on 7 May.  
 
Gantamirov's particular phraseology recalls the famous incident in Ryazan in 
1999 when the agents of the local MVD arrested FSB agents who had laid mines 
in an apartment building. The MVD released the suspects after the FSB 
explained that the mining of the building was simply a training exercise. (See 
THE NIS OBSERVED, 17 Nov 00) In view of the persistent rumors that those 
engaged in acts of terror are Russian-sponsored provocateurs, Gantamirov's 
order may have been interpreted by some as a threat against Russian agents. 
Condemnation from official Russian circles followed swiftly, with Gryzlov calling 
Gantamirov's comments illegal and extremist. In fact by 7 May the prosecutor 
general had initiated an inquiry into the matter. By way of comparison, when on 4 
June the general in charge of military operations in Chechnya, Gennady Troshev, 
made similar comments about stringing up "bandits" in the town square, no 
action by the prosecutors office seemed forthcoming.  
 
As he reiterated on 4 June, Gantamirov would execute "terrorists" without the 
"delay" associated with arrest, detention, and trial. These comments did not 
dissuade Kazantsev from appointing him federal inspector, tasked with 
overseeing Chechnya's reconstruction and planning its constitution and elections.  
 
Some contend that negotiations with Chechnya's president, Aslan Maskhadov, 
would be futile because rival commanders might not comply with his orders. Yet 
few note that Russia's forces are plagued by similar rifts and competitions. In 
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view of his sparring with the MVD, Gantamirov's recent appointment by 
Kazantsev indicates deep cleavages among powerful Russian factions. 
Chechnya is the field in which bureaucrats and officers battle for personal riches 
and career advancement.  
 
Chechnya policy is by no means the only arena in which competitions among 
client-patron networks take precedence over basic values such as the rule of law, 
freedom of speech and the interests of the state. However, due to the mounting 
casualties and enormous suffering, it is in Chechnya that the failure to formulate 
policy is most tragic. Only a realization that no amount of tinkering with 
appointments will save the Russian campaign can lead to a fundamental 
reassessment of Russia's political objectives and strategies. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization admits Uzbekistan, signs accords 
On 14 and 15 June, the leaders and defense ministers of the Shanghai-Five 
countries met in Beijing. At this summit, the group officially changed its name to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time since the group's 
inception in 1996, the so-called Shanghai Spirit, effectively the group's manifesto, 
was evoked. According to commentators, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization is not an alliance system, but rather a partnership between 
countries with common aims and problems. Its goal is to seek "extensive bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation and exchange, to put peace and security on a more 
solid foundation." (XINHUA, 15 Jun 01; FBIS-CHI-2001-0615, via World News 
Connection) The official Chinese press claims that the partnership does not 
target any third party; instead, the organization will strive to end the Cold War 
mentality held by its members, and to achieve a win-win situation for them. 
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Despite the statements that the Shanghai group does not intend to target third 
parties, it is obvious that this partnership is intended to counter US interests in 
the region. The US has invested heavily in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
especially with regard to the Partnership for Peace program, and the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline. Statements emanating from the summit illustrate this point. A 
communiqué issued by the defense ministers, arguing against the missile 
defense system advocated by the US, stated that the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization considers the 1972 ABM Treaty to be central to world security, and 
warned of "huge damage" if the US violates the treaty and proceeds with 
development of the system. (THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 18 June 2001)  
 
The same communiqué also discussed the strengthening of military cooperation, 
in order to crack down on "terrorism" and "Islamic Fundamentalism." The leaders 
signed a pact on this issue, which is separate from the Collective Security Treaty. 
(XINHUA, 15 Jun 01; FBIS-CHI-2001-0615, via World News Connection) 
 
In a press statement, the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also 
reiterated their belief that the organization is the "cornerstone of maintaining 
peace and security in the region," (XINHUA, 15 Jun 01; FBIS-CHI-2001-0615, via 
World News Connection) and confirmed their intention to honor agreements 
made at previous sessions such as the treaty signed in 1997 for the reduction of 
forces in border regions. Additionally, the leaders unanimously supported the 




The Beijing summit occurred at a time when Central Asia is facing serious 
problems, especially that of insurgency based apparently on Islam. Uzbekistan in 
particular has been laboring under this issue, with the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) regularly launching incursions from its bases in neighboring 
Afghanistan. Speaking in an interview after his country was admitted into the 
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organization, President Islam Karimov said that Uzbekistan had "joined the 
organization for reasons of security and economic opportunity." (TURKISTAN 
NEWSLETTER, 18 Jun 01; via Turkiynet) In the same interview President 
Karimov also spoke of his conviction that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
must avoid becoming a military bloc, and argued that, because of Russia's 
influence in Central Asia, countries in the region are pressured to oppose the 
Partnership for Peace program. He added that those countries which are 
signatories of the CST are "having to oppose NATO expansion, since Russia has 
made public its view." President Karimov said that, because of Russia and 
China's strength in security and economic areas, it was vital for Uzbekistan to ally 
herself with them if she wished to develop further. (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 
18 Jun 01; via Turkiynet)  
 
The next summit of the heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will take 
place in September 2001. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
LATVIA 
Are relations between Latvia and Russia improving? 
Despite Latvia's past bad blood with Russia over citizenship eligibility, it seems 
that the Baltic state may be signalling a willingness to cooperate more with its 
historically not so friendly neighbor. In the first weeks of June, the Latvian 
government decided to lower naturalization fees and to let Latvian-language 
examinations given in schools substitute for the rigorous state language 
examinations for citizenship. Additionally, for the first time in 10 years, top 
Moscow and Riga officials began several days of meetings on 20 June to 
establish cooperation between the two capitals. The officials agreed to sign a 
protocol in the near future to cooperate on tourism economy, trade, education 
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and culture. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 28 Jun 01) Riga Mayor Gundars Bojars also 
met with Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman 
Konstantin Kosachev, Moscow City Council Chairman Vladimir Platonov and 
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev. 
 
But the apparent progress towards improved relations between the two countries 
was clouded by an indirect verbal imbroglio between the two respective 
presidents. At a summit meeting during US President George W. Bush's 
European tour in June, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that 40 percent of 
the Latvian population is still unable to obtain citizenship. This statement 
indicates that Russia remains intent on politically manipulating claims of human 
rights violations against Russians in Latvia. Latvian President Vaira Vike-
Freiberga responded in an interview with an Austrian newspaper: "President 
Putin is juggling with incorrect figureswe have a citizenship law that meets every 
international criterionthere is no basis for President Putin's complaints that we 
discriminate against part of our population." (DIE PRESSE, 20 Jun 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0620, via World News Connection) However, Vike-Frieberga was 
encouraged by the US president's support concerning the Baltic states and 
NATO enlargement, declaring that his statements contained a "courageous 
insight on a free and united Europe based on common values." (BNS, 1013 
GMT, 16 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0616, via World News Connection) The 
Latvian president also predicted that Latvia's relationship with Russia would 
improve definitively once NATO accepts Latvian membership. "We are still 
outside of EU and NATObut as soon as we are members, Russia will have to 
reconcile itself to this new fact and react differently." (DIE PRESSE, 20 Jun 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0620, via World News Connection)  
 
LITHUANIA 
Government undergoes major changes 
In the past month Lithuania has undergone major changes in its political party 
system, including the collapse of the seven-month-old "New Politics" majority 
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coalition government. Before last year's parliamentary elections, President 
Valdas Adamkus and his advisors created the "New Politics" bloc, with the free-
market-oriented Liberal Union as the core, in order to form a parliamentary 
majority (71 out of 141 seats). The "New Politics" bloc emerged from five parties, 
the two largest of which were the Liberal Union (LU) and the New Union/Social 
Liberals (NU/SL). But the rivalry between the two main parties of the coalition 
bloc proved stronger than either party's willingness to resolve their differences on 
the issue of the privatisation of Lithuanian Gas. As a result, the opposition Social-
Democratic Party (SDP), lead by the popular ex-President Algirdas Brazauskas, 
is now forming a large bloc with the NU/SL and two smaller parties (Peasants 
Party and New Democracy). With the 48 SDP seats, the 29 NU/SL seats, and the 
two other parties' 10 seats, the new bloc controls a clear majority of the 141 
parliament seats.  
 
On 18 June the ruling coalition's Political Coordinating Committee called on 
Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas to resign. When Paksas initially refused, the six 
ministers who had been nominated by the NU (Foreign Affairs, Social Security 
and Labor, Health, Agriculture, Education and Culture, and Interior) resigned. 
The constitution stipulates that if more than half of the cabinet changes, the 
government must receive the approval of parliament. Paksas, having no other 
constitutional choice, resigned on 20 June. President Adamkus accepted Paksas' 
resignation and appointed Finance Minister Jonas Lionginas as acting prime 
minister. At a parliament session on 2 July, Adamkus nominated Social 
Democratic Party Chairman Algirdas Brazauskas for prime minister, and the new 
ruling majority supported the nomination. 
 
The change in government may stop what had looked to be a possible solution to 
the Lithuanian oil industry's recurrent problems of supply. On 15 June, Williams 
International (operator of Mazeikiai Oil Refinery) announced that it had signed a 
10-year supply agreement with Russia's YUKOS oil company. But Williams will 
not receive loans to modernize the refinery from the European Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development until the government ratifies the agreement. 
Brazauskas has been critical of the YUKOS-Williams deal, and with the dramatic 
change in the Lithuanian government, it is doubtful that the parliament will ratify 
the agreement any time soon. The new government may further impede 
Lithuania's already problematic privatization process. 
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